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The major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Texas Supreme Court issued several opinions relating to subject
matter jurisdiction. In Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, the
Texas Supreme Court addressed whether the common law distinction be-
tween governmental and proprietary acts applies to a breach of contract
claim.1 This case involved a lease entered into by the City of Jacksonville
and the Wassons, which required the leased property be used for residen-
tial purposes only.2 When the City served an eviction notice for failure to
abide by the lease, the Wassons sued for breach of contract. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the City, and the Tyler Court of
Appeals affirmed based on governmental immunity.3 Specifically, the
court of appeals found that immunity was the “default position,” and it
had not been waived by the City.4 The Wassons appealed to the supreme
court.
The supreme court recognized that prior to its decision in Tooke v. City
of Mexia,5 it was generally assumed that the governmental and proprie-
tary acts distinction applied in the contract context.6 However, because of
some language in the Tooke decision, several courts of appeals concluded
that the distinction did not apply to contract claims.7 Before beginning its
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1. Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 429–30 (Tex. 2016).
2. Id. at 430.
3. Id. at 431.
4. Id.
5. 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006).
6. Wasson Interests, 489 S.W.3d at 436 & n.9.
7. Id. at 435 n.8.
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analysis, therefore, the supreme court made clear that it had not reached
that issue in Tooke, such that courts’ reliance on the Tooke language was
misplaced.8 The supreme court proceeded to exhaustively analyze the is-
sue using a two-step process, concluding that the proprietary-governmen-
tal dichotomy should apply in the contract context just as it does in the
tort context.9 The supreme court therefore held that the City did not have
immunity, as entering into the lease was a proprietary act, and remanded
to the court of appeals for review of the City’s alternative grounds for
summary judgment.10
In McIntyre v. El Paso Independent School District,11 the Texas Su-
preme Court addressed when a school district could be sued without the
claimant having exhausted administrative remedies provided for in the
Education Code. The plaintiffs in the trial court homeschooled their chil-
dren and “refused to sign a homeschool verification form provided by El
Paso Independent School District.”12 They were subsequently “criminally
charged with contributing to truancy,” and plaintiffs alleged that the
charges were in retaliation for their refusal to sign the verification form.13
The plaintiffs sued the district and various officers for allegedly violating
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.14 The defendants “filed pleas to the juris-
diction, special exceptions, and motions to dismiss,” which the trial court
denied.15 The defendants then filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing,
among other things, that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administra-
tive remedies. The El Paso Court of Appeals agreed with the defendants,
and the plaintiffs sought review in the supreme court.
The supreme court noted that the Education Code granted the Com-
missioner of Education the exclusive authority to address certain educa-
tion-related disputes and required the exhaustion of administrative
remedies before Texas courts had jurisdiction over those matters.16 The
supreme court found, however, that not every dispute arising in an educa-
tion context is within the scope of the Commissioner’s exclusive author-
ity, such that whether a plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative
remedies depends on the claim asserted rather than the identity of the
defendant.17 For the exhaustion requirement to apply, the supreme court
held that the claim must be based on either the school laws themselves or
a school board’s violation of the school laws.18 Finding plaintiffs’ alleged
constitutional violations were not based on school laws, the supreme
8. Id. at 434 & n.7.
9. Id. at 439.
10. Id.
11. 499 S.W.3d 820, 821 (Tex. 2016).




16. Id. at 823 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(a) (West 2012); Clint Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 544–45 (Tex. 2016)).
17. Id. at 825.
18. Id. at 826.
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court held plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies
and dismissal of their claims was therefore improper.19
In a mandamus proceeding, the Texas Supreme Court held that a po-
tential claim must be ripe for a court to have jurisdiction to allow pre-suit
discovery under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.20 The
supreme court noted that while Rule 202 allows pre-suit discovery re-
garding an anticipated action and potential claims, a claim means an ex-
isting right, not a speculative or future right, and an action means a suit
over which the trial court would currently have jurisdiction.21 Because
the claim on which discovery was sought was not ripe, it did not support
subject matter jurisdiction, and discovery under Rule 202 was not
permitted.22
The Waco Court of Appeals likewise held that pre-suit discovery under
Rule 202 cannot be granted if the claim sought to be investigated would
be barred by sovereign or governmental immunity.23 The court agreed
with several other appellate courts that Rule 202 does not waive sover-
eign immunity, and to the extent a proposed claim would be barred by
sovereign immunity, it was an abuse of discretion to grant Rule 202
discovery.24
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
For the first time, the Texas Supreme Court evaluated whether an al-
legedly defamatory television broadcast that could be received in Texas,
but did not originate in Texas, was sufficient to show that non-resident
defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of conducting
activities in Texas to support personal jurisdiction.25 In TV Azteca v.
Ruiz, a Mexican recording artist, who was a current Texas resident, sued
two Mexican broadcasters and a Mexican news anchor for defamation
after they aired a report from Mexico asserting that the recording artist
had criminally lured underage girls into sexual relationships with her
manager in the 1990s.26 The non-resident broadcasters and news anchor
filed special appearances, arguing that the mere fact the broadcast had
traveled into Texas was insufficient to support jurisdiction over them.27
The supreme court agreed with respect to the news anchor, but held that
under the circumstances, Texas courts could exercise specific jurisdiction
19. Id. at 827–29.
20. In re DePinho, 505 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
21. See id. at 623–24 (citing Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Suit,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
22. Id. at 625.
23. Vestal v. Pistikopoulos, No. 10-16-00034-CV, 2016 WL 4045081, at *3, *5 (Tex.
App.—Waco July 27, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
24. See id. at *3.
25. TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 46 (Tex. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-481, 2017
WL 2722433 (U.S. June 26, 2017).
26. Id. at 35–36.
27. Id. at 35, 44.
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over the broadcasters.28 The supreme court reasoned that the recording
artist submitted evidence demonstrating that the broadcasters “intention-
ally targeted Texas through their broadcasts” by promoting the broadcast
in Texas to increase their Texas audience and substantially benefited from
the broadcast in Texas by selling advertising to Texas businesses.29 The
supreme court found that the broadcasters’ conduct went beyond merely
transmitting from Mexico and that such conduct showed the broadcast-
ers’ intent to serve the Texas market and therefore purposefully avail
themselves of the benefits of conducting activities in Texas.30 The su-
preme court further held that the broadcasters’ acts targeted at the Texas
market allegedly caused injury to the recording artist in Texas such that a
Texas court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over them was
appropriate.31
The permissible scope of jurisdictional discovery under Rule 120a of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure was at issue in In re Federal Corp.32
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals granted a Taiwanese relator manda-
mus relief from part of a trial court’s order requiring it to respond to
hundreds of Rule 120a discovery requests propounded by a plaintiff in-
jured in an automobile accident allegedly caused by a faulty tire that was
designed, manufactured, and shipped by the relator.33 The court of ap-
peals instructed the trial court to vacate that part of its order, finding the
Rule 120a requests that sought information about the relator’s activities
in states other than Texas were overbroad and could have been more
narrowly tailored.34 The appellate court refused, however, to grant man-
damus relief on the requests seeking information about the relator’s com-
pliance with U.S. laws and regulations, reasoning that such requests were
as tailored as possible and could demonstrate that the relator “sought to
purposefully serve the American market [ ] in some way.”35
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS
During the Survey period, several courts addressed whether a plaintiff
exercised diligence in effecting service of process to determine if the ser-
vice date should relate back to the filing of the petition when the petition
preceded the expiration of the applicable limitations period but service
was not achieved until afterwards. In Shaw v. Lynch,36 the First Houston
Court of Appeals held that a four-week delay between receipt of a cita-
tion and service did not demonstrate a failure to exercise diligence as a
28. Id. at 34–35; 56.
29. Id. at 49–50; 56.
30. Id. at 49–50.
31. Id. at 54–55.
32. No. 13-16-00219-CV, 2016 WL 6519110, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 1,
2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
33. Id. at *1, *9.
34. Id. at *5.
35. Id. at *6.
36. No. 01-15-00040-CV, 2016 WL 1388986, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Apr. 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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matter of law because an “ordinary, prudent attorney may not suspect a
problem [with service] until an answer is not filed” by the expected an-
swer date.37 The court of appeals reasoned that delays in cases in which
lack of diligence had been found as a matter of law were “significantly
longer . . . than four weeks.”38 Further, the appellate court found a fact
issue existed because plaintiff’s counsel testified that “four Mondays” af-
ter the citations issued, he took steps to investigate whether service had
been effected; and realizing it had not, he asked the process server to
locate and serve the defendant “as expeditiously as possible” such that
summary judgment in favor of the defendant on limitations grounds was
unwarranted.39
Delay in service was also addressed in Zamora v. Tarrant County Hos-
pital District,40 where the El Paso Court of Appeals considered how many
“business days” elapsed when assessing whether a plaintiff exercised dili-
gence in serving a defendant during the holidays.41 The appellate court
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to a defendant on
limitations, finding a fact issue existed as to the plaintiff’s diligence when
the plaintiff’s attorney admitted that the citation, although received in the
mail, “got lost in the shuffle at his office in the days leading up to his
Christmas vacation,” and therefore was not served for twenty-eight
days.42 The court of appeals calculated that “[e]xcluding weekends,
Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, New Year’s Eve, and New Year’s Day,
the total delay period between receipt of citation from the district clerk
and [the plaintiff’s] counsel was nine business days,” and held the nine-
business-day delay was insufficient to establish plaintiff’s lack of diligence
as a matter of law.43
On the other end of the spectrum, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants
who were served over nine months after the filing of the petition in
Washko v. Simon Property Group, Inc.44 In this case, the delay resulted
from the plaintiff’s failure to pay the required fee for a service copy of the
citations. Plaintiff’s counsel did not realize this error until eight months
later during a “case review” in which counsel noticed that defendants had
not answered.45 The appellate court found that, without evidence explain-
ing the months-long delay between the time the answers would have been
due and the time the error was discovered, the nine-month delay demon-
37. Id. at *4–5 (quoting Keeton v. Carrasco, 53 S.W.3d 13, 20 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2001, pet. denied)).
38. Id. at *4.
39. Id.
40. 510 S.W.3d 584 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied).
41. Id. at 591–92.
42. Id. at 586–87, 591.
43. Id. at 591–92.
44. No. 02-15-00257-CV, 2016 WL 3027544, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 26,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
45. Id.
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strated the plaintiff’s lack of diligence as a matter of law.46
V. VENUE
The Texas Supreme Court addressed several venue-related issues dur-
ing the Survey period. In In re J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., the supreme
court clarified the standards for lower courts to determine the proper res-
olution of venue disputes based on dominant jurisdiction.47 The underly-
ing case involved an accident between a truck and a vehicle in Waller
County.48 The trucking company sued the vehicle occupants in Waller
County to recover for property damage.49 “Ten days later, the [vehicle]
occupants sued [the trucking company] in Dallas County to recover per-
sonal-injury damages.”50 The Dallas County trial court denied the truck-
ing company’s plea in abatement, which asserted dominant jurisdiction in
Waller County under the first-filed rule.51 After the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals summarily denied the trucking company’s request for mandamus
relief, the trucking company sought relief in the supreme court.
The supreme court began its analysis by determining whether the sub-
ject matter of the two lawsuits was inherently interrelated.52 In deciding
the question, the supreme court noted that its prior opinions directed that
Rule 97 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure should guide the analysis,
but had misstated the compulsory counterclaim rule in a way that af-
fected the outcome of the case.53 The vehicle occupants argued that their
claims were not compulsory under Rule 97 because they were the subject
of the pending action in Dallas County before they were required to an-
swer the trucking company’s Waller County suit. In ruling against the ve-
hicle occupants, the supreme court clarified that, while its prior opinions
stated that a counterclaim is compulsory if “it is not at the time of filing
the answer the subject of a pending action,”54 Rule 97 actually refers to
“the time of filing the pleading.”55 The supreme court therefore held that,
under a correct reading of Rule 97, “a counterclaim is compulsory if . . . it
was not the subject of a pending action when the original suit was com-
menced.”56 Because the vehicle occupants’ claims were not the subject of
a pending action at the time the trucking company commenced the Wal-
ler County suit, the supreme court held that the vehicle occupants’ claims
were compulsory counterclaims in the Waller County action, demonstrat-
46. Id. at *2–3.
47. In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).




52. Id. at 292 (citing Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. 1988)).
53. Id. at 292–93.
54. Id. at 292 (citing Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 247; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy
Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. 1999)).
55. Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 97(a)).
56. Id. at 293.
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ing that the subject matter of the two suits was inherently interrelated.57
With regard to the dominant jurisdiction question, the supreme court
held that the Dallas County trial court abused its discretion in denying
the trucking company’s plea in abatement because the Waller County
court had dominant jurisdiction under the first-filed rule.58 The supreme
court therefore granted the trucking company mandamus relief,59 order-
ing the Dallas County trial court to grant the trucking company’s plea.60
In In re Nationwide Insurance Company of America, the Texas Su-
preme Court addressed whether a party waived a forum-selection clause
by participating in a case.61 A former employee sued his employer for
breach of contract in Texas, although the contract at issue had a forum-
selection clause designating Ohio as the place to file suit.62 Early in the
suit, counsel for the employer indicated that “his client would seek to
enforce the forum-selection clause.”63 The employer nevertheless en-
gaged in significant activity in the Texas trial court, including filing special
exceptions, serving written discovery, obtaining an agreed confidentiality
and protective order, and filing two motions to dismiss.64 Two years after
the case was filed, and after changing counsel, the employer moved to
dismiss the Texas proceeding based on the forum-selection clause.65 The
employee argued in response that the employer’s substantial participa-
tion waived the forum-selection clause and that the employee was
prejudiced because his contract claim was now barred by Ohio limita-
tions.66 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Austin Court
of Appeals summarily denied mandamus relief. The supreme court found
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the employer’s motion
to dismiss.67
The supreme court began its analysis by noting that waiver in the con-
text of a forum-selection clause is more akin to estoppel and requires
“substantially invoking the judicial process to the other party’s detriment
or prejudice.”68 The supreme court reiterated that the employee’s time,
57. Id.
58. Id. at 293–98.
59. Id. at 300. In granting mandamus relief, the supreme court resolved a split among
the appellate courts as to whether mandamus relief was available to correct an erroneously
denied plea in abatement based on dominant jurisdiction. Id. at 299 n.53 (noting conflicting
decisions on the issue). The supreme court held that the more recent mandamus standard
articulated in In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceed-
ing), controlled over the more stringent standard of Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.
1985). See In re J.B. Hunt Transp., 492 S.W.3d at 298.
60. In re J.B. Hunt Transp., 492 S.W.3d at 300.
61. In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. 2016) (orig.
proceeding).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 711.
64. Id. at 713. The TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a motions to dismiss were not ruled on because
the employee voluntarily non-suited the challenged claims. See id.
65. Id. at 711.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 710.
68. Id. at 713 (citing In re ADM Inv’r Servs., Inc., 304 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2010)
(orig. proceeding)).
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effort, and funds expended in the Texas litigation were not a sufficient
detriment to avoid a forum-selection clause.69 Further, the supreme court
held that the employee’s claimed prejudice based on the now time-barred
contract claim was insufficient to defeat the forum-selection clause be-
cause the employer agreed to waive the limitations defense in any Ohio
proceeding.70 The supreme court reasoned that the employee’s injury was
merely theoretical, as he never actually suffered the prejudice given the
employer’s waiver of limitations.71
VI. PARTIES
In In re Empire Scaffold, LLC, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held
that a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to strike a
petition in intervention filed by eight plaintiffs who pled that they had “a
legal and equitable interest” in the underlying suit but who would not
have been entitled to recover the relief sought in their own names.72 The
employees’ claims against their employers were based on their respective
employment agreements to which the intervenors were not parties.73 The
appellate court held that the motion to strike should have been granted
because the intervenors did not have any right to relief under the employ-
ment agreements at issue.74 The court of appeals reasoned that the “prin-
cipal detriment to allowing the intervention” under the circumstances was
that it would allow the intervenors to circumvent a standing order prohib-
iting unrelated plaintiffs from suing in the same action to avoid the
county’s random assignment system.75
At issue in J. Fuentes Colleyville, L.P. v. A.S.76 was whether a restau-
rant should be permitted to intervene in a “friendly suit” to obtain court
approval of the settlement between a minor injured in an automobile ac-
cident, her underinsured motorist insurer, and the intoxicated driver who
caused the accident after being served alcohol at the restaurant. The res-
taurant pled that it was not seeking money damages in the suit but in-
tended only “to defend and defeat” the minor’s allegations that the driver
was intoxicated and that his intoxication was the proximate cause of the
minor’s injuries.77 On the minor’s motion, the trial court struck the res-
taurant’s intervention, and the restaurant appealed. The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals found the restaurant’s pled interest implausible because
the minor’s petition explicitly stated that suit was “filed for the sole and
specific purpose of obtaining judicial approval of the settlements,” and
69. Id. (citing In re Automated Collection Techs., Inc., 156 S.W.3d 557, 559–60 (Tex.
2004) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
70. Id. at 714.
71. Id.
72. In re Empire Scaffold, LLC, No. 09-16-00052-CV, 2016 WL 1469185, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Apr. 14, 2016, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.).
73. Id. at *2.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 501 S.W.3d 239, 240–41 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.).
77. Id. at 242.
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the appellate court noted that it could not “be said with any seriousness
that the original petition reflect[ed] a conventional effort to impose liabil-
ity upon [the driver] and [the insurer] for the purpose of obtaining a judg-
ment against them for damages.”78 The appellate court concluded that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the intervention be-
cause the restaurant did not allege any facts showing it had an interest
affected by the minor’s suit.79 The court of appeals further held that even
if the restaurant had a justiciable interest, the trial court would have been
within its discretion to strike the plea because the restaurant was “fully
capable of protecting [its] interests” in a separately filed suit against it for
Dram Shop Act violations in which it could assert contributory negli-
gence claims or designate non-parties as responsible third parties.80
Given this, the appellate court concluded that allowing the restaurant to
intervene in the minor’s suit would complicate already resolved
litigation.81
VII. PLEADINGS
A petition for a pre-suit deposition under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure requires a petitioner to “present evidence to meet its
burden to establish the facts necessary to obtain the deposition.”82 Noting
that the Dallas, Tyler, and Amarillo Courts of Appeals have all held that
a verified petition alone, without more, is not adequate to satisfy this bur-
den, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals determined that it need not
reach that issue when a verified petition’s allegations were so “vague and
conclusory” as to the necessity for pre-suit Rule 202 depositions in the
petitioner’s investigation of a potential claim for tortious interference
with the lawful use of property that it could be denied on that basis
alone.83
A developer asserted a breach of contract claim against a builder’s
president who signed a contract on behalf of the builder in Mission
Grove, L.P. v. Hall.84 The developer alleged that the builder’s president
was personally liable for the damages resulting from the breach because
he had personally guaranteed the contract, but the president obtained
summary judgment on the breach claim since he had not signed in his
individual capacity.85 Over four years after the original petition was filed,
the developer amended its petition, adding claims “for promissory estop-
78. Id. at 243–44.
79. Id. at 244.
80. Id. at 244–45.
81. Id.
82. In re East, 476 S.W.3d 61, 68 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2014, orig. proceeding)
(citing In re Hochheim Prairie Farm Mut. Ins. Ass’n, 115 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2003, orig. proceeding); In re Dall. Cty. Hosp. Dist., No. 05-14-00249-CV, 2014
WL 1407415, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 1, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)).
83. Id. at 69.
84. 503 S.W.3d 546, 549–50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
85. Id. at 550.
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pel, fraud and negligent misrepresentation.”86 The president moved for
summary judgment on those claims, arguing that the newly-asserted
claims did not relate back to the original petition and therefore were
barred by limitations.87 The trial court granted the motion, and the devel-
oper appealed.88 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the later-filed claims, holding
that those claims were based on the same transaction or occurrence as the
timely-filed contract claim.89 The appellate court rejected the president’s
argument that the later-filed claims should not relate back because the
contract claim was disposed of on summary judgment, explaining that a
“valid cause of action” does not have to be meritorious for later-asserted
claims based on the same transaction to relate back to the filing of the
original petition.90
The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the sufficiency of a petition in
Paz v. Fatima Construction & Cleaning Co., which was a suit for breach
of contract, fraud, and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA) asserted against four defendants, including a limited liability
company and three individuals.91 When all defendants failed to answer,
the plaintiffs moved for and obtained a default judgment holding the de-
fendants jointly and severally liable for approximately two million dol-
lars.92 An individual defendant, Paz, filed a motion for new trial, which
the trial court denied, and Paz appealed.93 The court of appeals held that
the petition failed to give Paz sufficient information to enable her to de-
termine the legal or factual basis of the allegations that she was responsi-
ble for the other three defendants’ conduct.94 The appellate court
concluded that the allegations that Paz was a “de facto” manager of the
limited liability company, its “primary agent[ ]” in the business transac-
tions, and that Paz had “obligated [it] to provide services to customers
whom she knew had no intention of fully paying off their accounts,”95
even when taken as true, did not state a DTPA or fraudulent misrepre-
sentation claim against Paz and did not provide fair notice of any other
potential cause of action against her.96
VIII. DISCOVERY
Once again, applications for pre-suit depositions under Rule 202 of the




89. Id. at 556–57.
90. Id.
91. Paz v. Fatima Construction & Cleaning Co., No. 05-15-00911-CV, 2016 WL
4050405, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 27, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
92. Id. at *1–2.
93. Id. at *2.
94. Id. at *3.
95. Id. at *1.
96. Id. at *3.
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ing the Survey period. In In re DePinho,97 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a trial court can order a Rule 202 deposition to
investigate unripe claims. The petitioner was a medical doctor at MD An-
derson Cancer Center who feared he would not receive credit for his role
in the preparation of an antibiotic with the potential to treat cancer and
type-2 diabetes. Roughly one month before his employment contract was
set to expire, he filed a petition to take Rule 202 depositions of two of his
colleagues to investigate a tortious interference claim.98 The trial court
authorized the depositions, albeit with limitations on their time and
scope, and the First Houston Court of Appeals denied the relators’ re-
quest for mandamus relief.99
The supreme court, however, granted mandamus relief.100 According
to the supreme court, for a Rule 202 deposition to be appropriate, the
trial court “must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the anticipated ac-
tion,” which cannot be used to adjudicate claims that are not yet ripe or
must be brought in another forum (such as patent actions, which can only
be brought in federal court).101 Since the petitioner was seeking to inves-
tigate claims (1) for tortious interference with a patent application that
had not yet been filed; and (2) arising out of his employment, which was
ongoing at the time he filed his petition, the supreme court held that the
trial court erred in ordering the depositions.102
The intersection of Rule 202 and sovereign immunity was at issue in
Vestal v. Pistikopoulos.103 In this case, one faculty member at Texas
A&M University sought to depose a former staff member, who had ac-
cused him of harassing her, to determine if he had defamation or other
tort claims against her.104 The respondent filed a plea to the jurisdiction,
claiming that (1) the university’s “sovereign immunity . . . extend[ed] to
her for conduct within the course and scope of her employment”; and (2)
the deposition “would interfere with an ongoing sexual harassment inves-
tigation.”105 The trial court ordered the deposition to proceed and over-
ruled the respondent’s plea to the jurisdiction, and she sought mandamus
relief.106 After noting that Rule 202 does not waive sovereign immunity,
the Waco Court of Appeals found that the petitioner’s Rule 202 petition
was too broad, as it did not distinguish between alleged statements within
the course and scope of the respondent’s employment, which could po-
tentially implicate sovereign immunity, and statements outside the course
97. 505 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 622–23 (citing In re DePinho, No. 01-14-00878-CV, 2015 WL 1544535, at *1
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2015, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.)).
100. Id. at 625.
101. Id. at 623 (quoting In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding)).
102. Id. at 623–25.
103. No. 10-16-00034-CV, 2016 WL 4045081, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco July 27, 2016,
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and scope of her employment, which would not implicate immunity.107
The court of appeals thus concluded that the trial court erred in denying
the respondent’s plea to the jurisdiction and in granting the Rule 202 pe-
tition, but it gave the petitioner leave to amend his petition to avoid im-
munity or other issues that were not discoverable.108
The scope of a discovery order was the subject of In re National Lloyds
Insurance Co.109 The plaintiffs filed several suits against the defendant
insurer, in which they claimed they were underpaid for the losses they
sustained as a result of two hail storms that occurred in Hidalgo County
in March 2012 and April 2012.110 Claims arising out of the storms were
transferred to a pre-trial court, which appointed a master to help review
discovery disputes.111 The pre-trial court ordered the insurer to produce
various categories of documents, including all emails, reports attached
thereto, and follow-up correspondence regarding the insurer’s manage-
ment reports, and it assessed $15,726.25 as sanctions for attorney’s
fees.112 The insurer moved for reconsideration based on a recent Texas
Supreme Court decision barring the discovery of evidence related to
other insurance claims,113 but the pre-trial court denied the motion.114
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief, finding
that the insurer had “waived any objection to the relevance or breadth”
of the discovery requests at issue.115 The Texas Supreme Court, however,
disagreed and conditionally granted mandamus relief.116 Initially, the su-
preme court found that, even though the insurer “ultimately withdrew its
objections and privilege assertions” to the discovery requests at issue, it
had preserved its complaint by objecting from the outset that the man-
agement reports and emails at issue were overbroad, irrelevant, and con-
trary to the supreme court’s earlier decision.117 In turn, even though the
plaintiffs had tailored their requests to the Hidalgo County storms in
March through April 2012, the pre-trial master’s order was not so limited,
and the responsive reports encompassed claims in different counties with
different causes and dates of loss.118 Although the plaintiffs contended
these reports were relevant to their extra-contractual and punitive dam-
ages claims, in which they sought to show that the insurer had a pattern
107. Id. at *5.
108. Id.
109. 507 S.W.3d 219, 220–21 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
110. Id. at 220.
111. Id. at 221.
112. Id. at 222.
113. Id. (citing In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d 486, 489–90 (Tex. 2014) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 222–23 (citing In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 13-14-00713-CV, 2015 WL
3751701, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 29, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)).
116. Id. at 226.
117. Id. at 223–26. According to the supreme court, the insurer preserved its complaints
through its response briefing to the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the pretrial master’s ruling
and to compel. Id. at 223.
118. Id. at 225.
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and practice of defrauding its insureds, the supreme court held they were
unable “to discover documents unrelated to the insurance event at is-
sue.”119 The supreme court thus conditionally granted mandamus relief,
directing the pre-trial court to vacate its order requiring the production of
the management reports and emails and requesting a reevaluation of the
sanctions.120
In contrast, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals declined to grant
mandamus relief regarding a discovery order in In re Navistar, Inc.121 In
this case, the plaintiff had purchased fifteen trucks with engines manufac-
tured by the defendant that were allegedly defective, and the plaintiff
secured orders from the trial court requiring the production of documents
pertaining to an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) regarding the defendant’s representations with respect to its
development of a “next generation” engine.122 The defendant sought
mandamus relief, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in
requiring the production of documents on products that the defendant
had not manufactured and the plaintiff had not used.123 After acknowl-
edging that the Texas Supreme Court had granted mandamus relief in
product-liability cases regarding the production of documents on prod-
ucts the plaintiff never used, the court of appeals found that discovery of
other products could be appropriate where there was a “connection be-
tween the alleged defect and the discovery ordered.”124 In light of the
fact that there were some similarities between the two engines, the court
of appeals found that the trial court did not err in ordering the production
of documents regarding the SEC investigation.125
The intersection of trade secrets and discovery was at issue in In re M–I
L.L.C.126 An employee of the defendant accepted a position with a com-
petitor and filed suit to invalidate his non-compete agreement, and his
former employer counterclaimed for breach of that agreement and as-
serted third-party claims against his new employer for misappropriation
of trade secrets and tortious interference.127 At the temporary injunction
hearing, the former employer tried “to establish its trade secrets through
the oral testimony of” one of its employees, and it sought to exclude from
the courtroom, among other individuals, the new employer’s designated
representative.128 When the trial court denied this request, the former
119. Id. (citing In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d 486, 489–90 (Tex. 2014) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
120. Id. at 226.
121. 501 S.W.3d 136, 143 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, orig. proceeding).
122. Id. at 138.
123. Id. at 141.
124. Id. at 141–42 (citing In re Exmark Mfg. Co., 299 S.W.3d 519, 529–30 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Chisti 2009, orig. proceeding)).
125. Id. at 142. The court of appeals also rejected the defendant’s claim that the re-
quested documents need not be produced because they related to a confidential govern-
mental investigation. Id. at 142–43.
126. 505 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
127. Id. at 573.
128. Id.
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employer obtained a recess so it could petition the court of appeals for a
writ of mandamus, and when it filed its petition, the former employer
“submitted in camera . . . an affidavit . . . detailing the testimony [its
employee] was prepared to offer.”129 The court of appeals rejected both
the former employer’s mandamus petition as well as the motion of the
former employee and the new employer to obtain access to the
affidavit.130
The former employee and the new employer then moved the trial court
to compel the production of the affidavit on the ground that it was a
discoverable witness statement under Rule 194.2 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure.131 Without reviewing the affidavit, the trial court or-
dered its disclosure, and the former employer sought mandamus relief
from the Texas Supreme Court regarding the trial court’s disclosure or-
der.132 The supreme court granted mandamus relief, finding that, since
the affidavit “was the only evidence that could substantiate whether it
did, in fact, contain trade secrets, the trial court had . . . to review it in
camera before ruling on whether . . . it contained trade secrets.”133 Even
though Rule 507(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides a privilege
for trade secrets that “will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work
injustice,” the supreme court determined that the trial court could not
reach a conclusion on Rule 507(a)’s applicability without first reviewing
the affidavit.134
The propriety of death-penalty sanctions was the subject of In re First
Transit Inc.135 Following a multi-vehicle, multi-collision accident, the
plaintiffs filed a wrongful death and survival action against (among other
defendants) the operator of a bus involved in the accident.136 The defend-
ants hired an expert on accident reconstruction, who began his investiga-
tive analysis the day after the accident.137 The plaintiffs sought
information and documents regarding the expert’s opinions, and they
filed multiple motions to compel to obtain those items.138 The trial court
ordered the production of the expert’s entire file and stated that the de-
fendants’ failure to comply would result in their inability to elicit any tes-
timony from him.139 The expert’s deposition was scheduled shortly before
trial, and on the eve of it, the defendants produced forty pages of recently
created documents.140 The plaintiffs cancelled the deposition and filed a
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing In re M–I L.L.C., No. 14-14-00705-CV, 2014 WL 5591575 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 4, 2014, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 573–74.
133. Id. at 579 (citing Weisel Enters., Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex 1986) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
134. Id. at 579–80 (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 507(a)).
135. 499 S.W.3d 584, 598 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding).
136. Id. at 588.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 589–90.
139. Id. at 590.
140. Id.
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motion to exclude the expert’s testimony.141 The trial court excluded the
expert from testifying, and the defendants sought mandamus relief.142
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found that the trial court
abused its discretion and granted mandamus relief.143 The court of ap-
peals initially noted that, even though death-penalty sanctions were typi-
cally associated with the striking of pleadings or the rendering of a
default judgment, any case-determinative sanctions, “including those that
exclude essential evidence,” could amount to death-penalty sanctions.144
Since the expert was the “[d]efendants’ only retained expert on negli-
gence and causation,” the exclusion of his testimony “effectively pre-
clude[d] the presentation of [their] defense.”145 The court of appeals then
determined that, even though the expert created the documents on the
eve of his deposition and the defendants had violated the discovery order,
it observed that one possible lesser sanction was the exclusion of those
newly-created documents.146 Since the record did not contain any indica-
tion that the trial court had considered lesser sanctions or a reasonable
explanation as to the appropriateness of its exclusion of the expert, the
court of appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion.147 Finally,
the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that the exclusion of
the expert should be affirmed on the basis of the defendants’ failure to
describe the expert’s mental impressions and opinions pursuant to Rule
194.2(f)(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, as the plaintiffs had not
raised that ground before the trial court.148
In Medina v. Raven, the First Houston Court of Appeals addressed va-
rious issues regarding deemed admissions.149 The defendant sought sum-
mary judgment on the basis of deemed admissions regarding liability, and
she contended that the underlying requests had been served on counsel
for plaintiffs.150 In their response, the plaintiffs asserted that they had
responded to the requests, albeit not within thirty days of the date the
requests were first mailed.151 At the hearing, the defendant argued that,
since the plaintiffs “had not [moved] to have their admissions un-
141. Id. at 591.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 598.
144. Id. at 592 (citing In re RH White Oak, LLC, 442 S.W.3d 492, 501 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding) (per curiam)).
145. Id. at 593.
146. Id. at 593–94.
147. Id. at 594–95. But see Alma Invs., Inc. v. Bahia Mar Co-Owners Ass’n, 497 S.W.3d
137, 144 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, pet. denied) (upholding the imposition of death-
penalty sanctions where the trial court had considered and imposed lesser sanctions, which
were ineffective).
148. In re First Transit, 499 S.W.3d at 595–96. Chief Justice Kem Thompson Frost dis-
sented, finding that the defendants did not violate the trial court’s order by producing
documents one or two days after the defendants’ expert created them. Id. at 601–02 (Frost,
C.J., dissenting).
149. Medina v. Raven, 492 S.W.3d 53, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no
pet.).
150. Id. at 54–55.
151. Id. at 55–56.
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deemed,” she was entitled to summary judgment, whereas the plaintiffs
alleged that the requests had initially been sent to the wrong address and
that, if the trial court was not inclined to deny the motion for summary
judgment, they would file a motion to undeem the admissions.152 After
the trial court entered summary judgment in the defendant’s favor, the
plaintiffs filed motions for new trial and to set aside the deemed admis-
sions.153 The trial court denied both motions, and the plaintiffs
appealed.154
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside
merits-preclusive admissions.155 As the court of appeals correctly noted,
deemed admissions should be withdrawn “upon a showing of (1) good
cause, and (2) no undue prejudice.”156 The court of appeals found that
these standards were met, as the defendant had obtained the plaintiffs’
responses before moving for summary judgment, the plaintiffs believed
that their responses to the requests were timely, and there was a misun-
derstanding as to the identity of the plaintiffs’ counsel at the time.157 In
response to the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs had failed to at-
tach any affidavits or other evidence establishing these elements, the
court of appeals noted that, when dealing with merits-preclusive admis-
sions, “good cause exists absent bad faith or callous disregard of the
rules.”158 The court of appeals also noted that the defendant had not
presented any evidence that she was prejudiced by the withdrawal of the
deemed admissions.159
During the Survey period, Texas courts also applied existing standards
to address efforts to take “apex” depositions,160 the propriety of sanc-
tions for various types of misconduct,161 the standing of a patient to ob-
ject to the production of his medical records by a third party,162 and the
152. Id. at 56.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 58.
155. Id. at 64.
156. Id. at 58 (quoting Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. 2005) (per
curiam)).
157. Id. at 59.
158. Id. at 62 (citing In re Sewell, 472 S.W.3d 449, 456 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, orig.
proceeding)).
159. Id. at 64.
160. See In re Semgroup Corp., No. 04-16-00230-CV, 2016 WL 3085875, at *2–3 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio June 1, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (finding that the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering “apex” depositions where the plaintiffs failed to show that
the potential deponents had “unique or superior knowledge of the discoverable informa-
tion” and had failed to exhaust other less intrusive methods to obtain the information they
were purportedly seeking).
161. See, e.g., Buttler v. Sutcliffe, No. 02-15-00319-CV, 2016 WL 4491224, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Aug. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in sanctioning the plaintiff for her deposition-related misconduct).
162. See In re R.C.K., No. 09-16-00132-CV, 2016 WL 3197585, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beau-
mont June 9, 2016, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding that a patient has
standing to object to the production of his medical records by his third-party medical
providers).
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need to provide contemporaneous time records in support of an award of
attorney’s fees entered as a sanction for discovery misconduct.163
IX. DISMISSAL
In an issue of first impression, Thuesen v. Amerisure Insurance Co.164
addressed whether fees could be awarded under Rule 91a of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure if the claims challenged as baseless were non-
suited. The question presented was “whether a trial court may consider a
Rule 91a movant a ‘prevailing party’ entitled to attorney’s fees under the
rule if the trial court determines the respondent nonsuited the claims to
avoid an adverse ruling on the 91a motion.”165 The Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals noted that Rule 91a.5(a) provided that “[t]he [trial]
court may not rule on a motion to dismiss if, at least [three] days before
the date of the hearing, . . . the challenged cause of action” is non-
suited.166 Based on this clear language, the court of appeals held that if a
party timely non-suits the challenged claims, “the movant cannot recover
costs and attorney’s fees . . . because [it] is not the prevailing party.”167
The court noted, however, that it was not addressing what the outcome
would be if the non-suit occurred “before the trial court rule[d] on the
Rule 91a motion but less than three days before the hearing date.”168
In Watson v. Hardman, a case involving the dismissal of claims under
the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act (TCPA),169 the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals decided another issue of first impression: whether a Rule 202 action
is a “judicial proceeding” encompassed by the TCPA.170 The court ulti-
mately concluded that a Rule 202 proceeding is a “judicial proceeding”
under the TCPA since a Rule 202 petition asks a court for relief in the
form of pre-suit discovery and the proceeding can be a contested mat-
ter.171 Accordingly, the court held that a Rule 202 petition is a communi-
cation pertaining to a judicial proceeding protected under the TCPA.172
In so holding, the court rejected the argument that only “communica-
tion[s] made in a judicial proceeding” concerning the public interest
“qualify as an exercise of the right to petition” under the TCPA.173 The
163. See CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528, 539–40 (Tex.
2016) (reversing an award of attorney’s fees and sanctions where the prevailing party failed
to produce its fee bills or other evidence permitting the trial court to determine the fees
that were actually incurred).
164. 487 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 300 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(a)).
167. Id. at 301 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5, a.7).
168. Id. at 301 n.4 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(c)).
169. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.001–.011 (West 2014). The TCPA provides,
among other things, that certain communications made in a judicial proceeding cannot
form the basis of claims against the communicating party. Id. § 27.003.
170. Watson v. Hardman, 497 S.W.3d 601, 605–06 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.)
(citing CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(4)(A)(1)).
171. Id. at 606 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1–.4).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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court reasoned that the TCPA does not include a public interest require-
ment, rendering any communication in a judicial proceeding an exercise
of the right to petition.174 The court therefore determined that claims
based on statements in a Rule 202 petition should be dismissed under the
TCPA.175
Two appellate courts reached different conclusions in deciding whether
a hearing is required on a motion to reinstate after a dismissal for want of
prosecution under Rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. In
Curnutt v. Conocophillips Co., the trial court dismissed the case after a
full hearing was held on a motion to retain.176 After the case was dis-
missed, the plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate, although there was a dis-
pute as to when the motion was actually filed with the trial court.177 It
was nonetheless clear that the trial court never held a hearing on the
motion.178 The El Paso Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff waived
his complaint by failing to adequately explain in his brief why the trial
court was required to hold a hearing on the motion to reinstate.179 The
court also held that any error in the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing
was harmless since a full hearing was held on the motion to retain prior to
dismissal, and nothing new was raised by the motion to reinstate.180
The Amarillo Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion when
faced with almost identical facts.181 In that case, the trial court gave no-
tice of intent to dismiss for want of prosecution and set a hearing.182 The
plaintiff filed a motion to retain the case and a hearing was held, although
there was no reporter’s record.183 The trial court dismissed the case, and
the plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate.184 The trial court did not hold a
hearing on the motion to reinstate, which was overruled by operation of
law.185 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that “the trial court abused its dis-
cretion . . . by failing to hold [a hearing] on the motion to reinstate.”186
While recognizing that appellate courts were split on the issue, the court
of appeals held that the language of Rule 165a required the trial court to
set a hearing on a motion to reinstate regardless of a request by the mo-
174. Id. (citing Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015) (per
curiam)).
175. Id.
176. Curnett v. Conocophillips Co., 508 S.W.3d 641, 642 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no
pet.).
177. Id. at 643.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 643–44.
180. Id. at 644 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); Dueitt v. Arrowhead Lakes Prop. Own-
ers, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 733, 741 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied)).
181. Parker v. Cain, 505 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, no pet.).




186. Id. at 120–21.
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vant.187 Given the language of Rule 165a, the court of appeals held that
the burden was on the trial court to set a hearing and its failure to do so
required reversal, despite also holding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in dismissing the case.188
X. JURY PRACTICE
In Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner,189 the Texas Su-
preme Court provided a lengthy and detailed analysis of Texas nuisance
law. After analyzing the history of this claim, the supreme court con-
cluded that “nuisance” does not refer to “a cause of action or to the de-
fendant’s conduct or operations”; rather, it focuses on “the particular
type of legal injury that can support a claim.”190 The supreme court also
concluded that the interference must be “‘substantial’ and cause[ ] ‘dis-
comfort or annoyance’ that is ‘unreasonable.’”191 Having announced the
standards, the supreme court then turned to some of the resulting proce-
dural issues, including whether the determinations of (1) whether the in-
terference was unreasonable; (2) “whether the defendant [acted]
intentionally or negligently”; and (3) “whether the interference result[ed]
from abnormally dangerous activities” presented fact questions for the
jury.192 Consistent with its prior rulings, the supreme court held that
these issues were for the jury, unless the underlying facts were undisputed
or reasonable minds could not differ on them.193 The propriety of an in-
junction, however, was a decision for the trial court, which was to be
made “after the case ha[d] been tried and the jury discharged.”194
Less than a week later, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals de-
termined, without citing Crosstex, that Texas does not recognize a cause
of action resulting from a prospective nuisance.195 In 1717 Bissonnet,
LLC, the jury found that the project at issue, if built, would be a nui-
sance, and the trial court entered judgment awarding the homeowners the
lost market value of their properties but disregarding the jury’s findings
that the homeowners had also been damaged in the use and enjoyment of
their property.196 Both the homeowners and the developer appealed. The
developer argued that the jury’s liability finding, which turned on
187. Id. at 122–23 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 165(a)(3), which provides that the court
clerk shall “deliver a copy of the motion [to reinstate] to the judge, who shall set a hearing
on the motion as soon as practicable”).
188. Id. at 123.
189. 505 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2016).
190. Id. at 594 (citing City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 504 (Tex. 1997)).
191. Id. at 595.
192. Id. at 609 (citing Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss, 397 S.W.3d 150, 155 (Tex.
2012)).
193. Id. (citing, e.g., Justiss, 397 S.W.3d at 155; Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251,
261 (Tex. 1999)).
194. Id. at 610 (quoting Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex.
2004)).
195. 1717 Bissonnet, LLC v. Loughhead, 500 S.W.3d 488, 497–500 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
196. Id. at 491–92.
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whether the project, if built, would constitute a nuisance, should be disre-
garded because there is no cause of action for “prospective nuisance.”
The court of appeals agreed, finding that a prospective nuisance can be
addressed only through an injunction, not an award of damages, leaving
no liability issues for the jury to decide.197
In In re Athans, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals initially
found that the jury’s verdict was not contrary to the overwhelming weight
of the evidence and that the trial court had abused its discretion in grant-
ing a new trial based on an alleged charge error of which neither side
complained.198 The court of appeals then turned to the voir dire conduct
of the defendants’ counsel. The trial court had instructed counsel “not to
discuss [evidentiary details] or argue the case during voir dire,” and it
found that a new trial was warranted due to the failure of the defendants’
counsel to comply with these admonitions.199 The court of appeals dis-
agreed, finding that the plaintiff waived any complaint about this conduct
by failing to object at the time, which meant a new trial could be granted
only if the error was “so fundamental that a gross injustice would result
absent a new trial.”200 Since this standard was not met, the court of ap-
peals granted mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to vacate its new
trial order.201
Claims of improper competition, coupled with conflicting jury answers,
were at issue in Hill v. Premier IMS, Inc.202 In this case, an employer sued
its former employee for various claims arising out of his decision to join a
competitor, and the former employee counterclaimed for unpaid commis-
sions. The jury found in the employer’s favor, and the former employee
appealed, alleging (among other errors) that the jury’s finding that the
employer had failed to pay certain commissions conflicted with its deci-
sion not to award any damages.203 The First Houston Court of Appeals
found that the former employee had failed to preserve error on this issue,
and thereby waived any complaint, by failing to object to this inconsis-
tency before the trial court discharged the jury.204
The sufficiency of objections to the members of the jury panel was at
issue in Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc. v. Bush.205 This case arose out of a
truck accident, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plain-
197. Id. at 496–97. This was true even though the homeowners might have been dam-
aged as a result of the plan to build the project. Id. at 498.
198. In re Athans, 478 S.W.3d 128, 138, 140 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
orig. proceeding).
199. Id. at 140.
200. Id. at 141 (citing United States v. Walton, 909 F.2d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 1990); In re
Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 758–59 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding)).
201. Id.
202. No. 01-15-00137-CV, 2016 WL 2745301, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May
10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
203. Id. at *9.
204. Id.
205. No. 05-14-01148-CV, 2016 WL 7488859, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 30, 2016)
(mem. op.), opinion withdrawn and superseded, No. 05-14-01148-CV, 2017 WL 1550035, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
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tiff based upon a jury verdict of over four million dollars.206 On appeal,
the defendant truck driver alleged error in the trial judge’s striking for
cause all of the potential jurors who would not commit to awarding an
unlimited amount of non-economic damages to the plaintiff, who favored
tort reform, or who were sympathetic to trucking companies.207 The Dal-
las Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that the improper
striking of potential jurors for cause can constitute reversible error only if
the appellant shows he was denied a trial by a fair and impartial jury.208
Since the truck driver did not object to any of the jurors on the panel that
was actually seated, the court of appeals presumed he was afforded a fair
and impartial jury and thus overruled his complaint.209
XI. JURY CHARGE
The need to secure a jury finding on a critical issue was one of the
subjects of Patterson v. Brewer Leasing, Inc.210 Following a fatal accident,
the plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against the truck driver and
several entities, including Texas Stretch, which allegedly hired the driver,
and Brewer Leasing, a related entity that purportedly owned or leased
the tractor-trailer combination. The plaintiff settled with many of the de-
fendants, including Texas Stretch and its insurer, but the release did not
include Brewer Leasing since Brewer Leasing’s insurer refused to cooper-
ate.211 The plaintiffs took a post-answer default judgment against Brewer
Leasing, and the trial court found that Texas Stretch employed the driver
and that both entities were his statutory employer under the theory of
“logo liability.”212 After obtaining an assignment of Brewer Leasing’s
claims against its insurer, the plaintiffs filed a bill of review proceeding
against Brewer Leasing, alleging that it “had concealed evidence about
the . . . cocaine in [the driver’s] system at the time of the accident.”213 The
trial court set aside the post-answer default judgment, as well as the cove-
nant not to execute and assignment, and set the plaintiffs’ claims against
Brewer Leasing for trial.214
At the trial, the plaintiffs contended that “Brewer Leasing was prima-
rily responsible for [the driver’s] negligence as lessee of the truck” and
that Brewer Leasing had ratified the driver’s actions, whereas Brewer
Leasing contended it was “only the owner, not the lessee,” and that Texas
Stretch and others were responsible.215 Even though Brewer Leasing’s
206. Id. at *2.
207. Id. at *3.
208. Id. (citing Solomon v. Steitler, 312 S.W.3d 46, 59 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no
pet.); City of Hawkins v. E.B. Ger. & Sons, 425 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1968,
writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
209. Id. (citing Solomon, 312 S.W.3d at 59).
210. 490 S.W.3d 205, 218 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
211. Id. at 207–08.
212. Id. at 208.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 212.
215. Id.
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logo and Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) number were on
the truck, and there was a written lease agreement stating that Texas
Stretch had leased the tractor to Brewer Leasing, the individual who
owned both entities testified that Brewer Leasing in fact owned the truck
and was leasing it to Texas Stretch.216 The jury found that the tractor was
not leased to Brewer Leasing and that Brewer Leasing had not ratified or
approved the driver’s gross negligence.217
In its post-trial motion for entry of judgment, the plaintiffs contended
that Brewer Leasing was vicariously liable because it owned the trailer
and was “judicially estopped [from denying] ownership of the tractor.”218
After the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ post-trial motions, the plaintiffs
appealed, arguing that Brewer Leasing was liable because its “representa-
tions and evidence at trial [established it] owned the tractor and trailer—
both regulated vehicles—and . . . there was no written lease . . . shifting
liability to any other entity.”219 According to the plaintiffs, both federal
law and state law require a written lease, and in the absence of such a
lease Brewer Leasing was vicariously liable as the owner.220 The First
Houston Court of Appeals rejected this argument, finding that even
though federal law and state law permit a vehicle owner to shift liability
through a written lease agreement to a lessee operating the vehicle, the
absence of such a written agreement does not render an oral lease inef-
fectual.221 Since the plaintiffs failed to secure a jury finding on respondeat
superior, and the issue was not conclusively established by the evidence,
the plaintiffs waived this complaint.222
In contrast, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals rejected a
waiver argument in Oiltanking Houston, L.P. v. Delgado,223 which was a
wrongful death action against a landowner arising out of the explosion of
a storage tank on its premises. The plaintiffs sought to establish the land-
owner’s liability under Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code, which addresses a property owner’s liability for the acts of
independent contractors.224 After the plaintiffs obtained a twenty-one
million dollar jury verdict in their favor, the landowner appealed.225 After
analyzing the terms and history of Chapter 95, the court of appeals turned
to the plaintiffs’ contention that the landowner had “waived all argu-
ments regarding Chapter 95 because [it] failed to request and obtain jury
findings” on the applicability of Section 95.002.226 The court of appeals
216. Id. at 213–14.
217. Id. at 214–15.
218. Id. at 215.
219. Id. at 217.
220. Id. at 218–19.
221. Id. at 219–20.
222. Id. at 221 (citing Jerry L. Starkey, TBDL, L.P. v. Graves, 448 S.W.3d 88, 102 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)).
223. 502 S.W.3d 202, 204–05 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
224. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 95.002, 95.003 (West 2011).
225. Oiltanking, 502 S.W.3d at 206.
226. Id. at 210.
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disagreed, finding that there were no disputed facts underlying the appli-
cability of Section 95.002, as the landowner was a “property owner,” the
decedent was an “employee of a contractor,” and his claim arose “from
the condition or use of an improvement to real property where the con-
tractor constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies the improvement.”227
The trial court’s failure to define a key term in the jury charge was at
issue in In re Athans.228 The plaintiff contended two of its former employ-
ees, while they were still employed, solicited other employees to work for
a new entity. The plaintiff sued the former employees for violating their
non-compete covenants, breaching their fiduciary duty, and aiding and
abetting the others’ breaches; it also sued the new entity for tortious in-
terference and for aiding and abetting the former employees.229 After a
jury verdict in the defendants’ favor, the plaintiff filed motions for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial, arguing that the jury’s
verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and that the
defendant’s counsel had committed improper and incurable jury argu-
ment during closing regarding the meaning of “solicit.”230 The trial court
granted the motion for new trial on both grounds, and the defendants
sought mandamus relief to set aside the new-trial order.231
After determining that the jury’s finding—that the former employees
did not breach their fiduciary duties—was not contrary to the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence,232 the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals
turned to the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial
based on an alleged charge error when neither side objected to the er-
ror.233 Since that failure to object would have resulted in a waiver on an
appeal from a final judgment, the court of appeals considered whether
the same preservation-of-error rules applied in the review of a trial
court’s decision to order a new trial.234 After examining the treatment of
this issue in federal courts and in Texas criminal cases, the court of ap-
peals declined to resolve this issue. It concluded that regardless of
whether those rules apply, the defendants failed to preserve error as to
any deficiencies in the charge, and a new trial was not appropriate be-
cause any error was not “so fundamental that a gross injustice would
[have resulted] absent a new trial.”235 The court of appeals thus con-
cluded that “the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial for
227. Id. at 210–11 (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 95.002). The court of appeals ulti-
mately found that there was no evidence that the landowner had actual knowledge of the
danger or condition resulting in the injury, as required by Section 95.003(2), and it thus
reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of the
landowner. Id. at 216–18.
228. 478 S.W.3d 128, 134–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding).
229. Id. at 131.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 132.
232. Id. at 138.
233. Id. at 139.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 139–40 (citing United States v. Walton, 909 F.2d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 1990); In
re Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 758–59 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding)).
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this [charge error].”236
The distinction between an objection to the formulation of a jury ques-
tion and the submission of the question itself was critical to the result in
Loera v. Fuentes.237 In this car-wreck case, the defendants contended that
the plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by their failure to wear seatbelts, and
even though the jury found the defendants partially culpable and
awarded substantial damages, the trial court entered a take-nothing judg-
ment based on the plaintiffs’ non-use of seatbelts. On appeal, the plain-
tiffs challenged one of the jury questions on the ground that it was
immaterial, and the defendants responded that the plaintiffs had waived
that error by not raising it in the charge conference.238 The El Paso Court
of Appeals determined that, since the plaintiffs’ objection was to the sub-
mission of a question that had resulted in the entry of the judgment, as
opposed to the specific terms of that question, they had preserved error;
however, this was a hollow victory, as the court of appeals nonetheless
ruled that the submission of the question was proper.239
The failure to submit proposed jury questions was one of the subjects
of Smith v. Overby.240 In this case, the plaintiffs sued their contractor for
breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence, and secured a six-
figure judgment.241 On appeal, the contractor challenged the trial court’s
refusal to include jury questions on whether its offer of repair was reason-
able and whether the plaintiffs had failed to mitigate their damages.242
Under the Residential Construction Commission Act, a contractor can
potentially limit a plaintiff’s damages by making a written settlement or
repair offer within fifteen days of the Residential Construction Commis-
sion’s determination, and the parties can agree in writing to extend this
deadline.243 The contractor’s written offer of repair was not made by the
fifteen-day deadline, and since there was no evidence that the homeown-
ers had agreed to extend that deadline, the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals found no error in the trial court’s refusal to submit a jury question
regarding the reasonableness of the contractor’s untimely offer.244 The
court of appeals also rejected the contractor’s challenges to the trial
court’s refusal to submit a jury question on mitigation, as it did not meet
236. Id. at 140 (citing In re Toyota, 407 S.W.3d at 758; In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377
S.W.3d 685, 688–89 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding)).
237. 511 S.W.3d 761, 765–66 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).
238. Id. at 766.
239. Id. at 767–68.
240. No. 04-15-00436-CV, 2016 WL 4444437, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 24,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
241. Id.
242. Id. at *2–3.
243. Id. at *2 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004 (West 2014)).
244. Id. at *2–3; see also Gunn v. McCoy, 489 S.W.3d 75, 114–16 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2016, pet. filed) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to include three instructions); Pattillo v. Franco, No. 14-15-00628-CV, 2016 WL
4533508, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding that the trial court’s refusal to include requested instructions was not an abuse of
discretion and probably did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment).
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its burden of showing that the plaintiffs’ conduct was “not that of a pru-
dent homeowner,” and in the absence of that showing, it was not entitled
to the submission of a jury question on mitigation.245
XII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
The Texas Supreme Court, in In re Bent,246 once again addressed the
standard for determining whether a motion for new trial was properly
granted by a trial court. The case involved a dispute between an insurer
and its insured regarding claims under a homeowners’ policy.247 Al-
though the insured prevailed at trial on some claims, the trial court
granted the insured’s motion for new trial for several reasons, including
that “the jury’s finding that [the insurer] did not breach the homeowner’s
policy was contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence” and that the evidence did not support the damages award.248 The
insurer sought mandamus relief from the First Houston Court of Appeals,
which concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a
new trial.249 The insured then sought relief from the Texas Supreme
Court. While the supreme court agreed with the result, it disagreed with
the court of appeals’ finding that the trial court’s explanation of its rea-
sons for granting the insured a new trial was facially sufficient under es-
tablished precedent.250 In that regard, the supreme court found that the
trial court’s order conflated legal grounds with factual sufficiency
grounds, and was thus not facially sufficient either.251
XIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
The Dallas Court of Appeals, in In re VSDH Vaquero Venture, Ltd.,
held that an attorney’s violation of Rule 3.08 of the Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct252 was not a legally sufficient basis for the trial
court to grant a new trial in the absence of a motion to disqualify.253 The
underlying dispute involved a house VSDH sold to husband and wife pur-
chasers with an option for the purchasers to require VSDH to buy back
the house at the original sales price. The purchasers sought to exercise the
245. Overby, 2016 WL 4444437, at *3.
246. 487 S.W.3d 170, 175–79 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
247. Id. at 173–74.
248. Id. at 175.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 180.
251. Id. at 179. The supreme court explained that if a jury finding was barred by a legal
conclusion, a new trial was inappropriate, and instead a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict was in order; if, on the other hand, the jury finding lacked sufficient factual support,
the trial court failed to specifically identify the lack of evidence that undermined the jury’s
finding. Id.
252. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.08(a), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013) (generally prohibits a lawyer from acting
as both an advocate and a witness in an adjudicatory proceeding when the lawyer’s testi-
mony is or may be necessary to establish an essential fact on behalf of the lawyer’s client).
253. In re VSDH Vaquero Venture, Ltd., No. 05-15-01513-CV, 2016 WL 2621073, at *8
(Tex. App.—Dallas, May 6, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
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repurchase option early at a discount and were allegedly told by the at-
torney-partner of VSDH that VSDH was insolvent and unable to per-
form the repurchase option.254 The purchasers thereafter sold the house
to a third party at a loss. The attorney-partner of VSDH filed suit against
the purchaser on VSDH’s behalf for breach of the option, and the pur-
chasers counterclaimed for repudiation. Several weeks before the trial
setting, VSDH filed a motion for continuance on the ground that the pur-
chasers had named the attorney-partner representing VSDH at trial as a
witness. The purchasers then filed a motion to disqualify the attorney
“because they did not want him to again use [R]ule 3.08 as an excuse for
continuance.”255 The trial court granted the motion to disqualify, and the
court of appeals, on mandamus review, found that the trial court had
abused its discretion in doing so because the purchasers had not
presented evidence that the attorney’s testimony was necessary and went
to an “essential fact,” or that purchasers would be prejudiced by the at-
torney’s dual advocate-witness role.256 The trial court vacated the dis-
qualification order, and the case proceeded to trial with the attorney
representing VSDH.
During a trial recess, the attorney informed the trial court that it had
become apparent that he may be compelled to testify adversely to VSDH
on the solvency issue in violation of Rule 3.08. The attorney and VSDH
then filed a joint motion to withdraw, and VSDH moved for a mistrial.
The trial court held a hearing on the motions and determined that the
trial should proceed without ruling on the motion to withdraw. After the
purchasers rested, VSDH called the attorney to testify, and the purchas-
ers neither objected nor moved to disqualify the attorney at that time.257
The jury found in favor of VSDH on all issues, and the purchasers filed a
motion for new trial, claiming that VSDH’s attorney violated Rule
3.08.258 The trial court granted the motion for new trial, and VSDH
sought mandamus review.259
On mandamus, the court of appeals determined that the sole basis for
the trial court’s grant of a new trial was VSDH’s attorney’s violation of
Rule 3.08260 and the resulting prejudice to the purchasers.261 The appel-
late court then held that in the absence of a timely motion to disqualify,
which the purchasers did not file despite being aware that the attorney
may testify, the violation of Rule 3.08 standing alone was an insufficient
legal basis to grant the purchasers a new trial.262 The court of appeals
254. Id. at *1.
255. Id. at *2.
256. Id. (citing In re VSDH Vaquero Venture, Ltd., No. 05-14-00958-CV, 2014 WL
4262167, at *2 (Tex. App—Dallas Aug. 28, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)).
257. Id. at *4.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at *4 n.4 (interpreting the trial court’s conclusion that the attorney ran “afoul”
of Rule 3.08 as a violation since the parties had done so).
261. Id. at *6.
262. Id. at *7.
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noted that the purchasers’ decision not to move to disqualify was likely
tactical, given that “it was only after the jury rendered an adverse verdict
that they claimed they should have been protected by [R]ule 3.08’s
prohibitions.”263 The appellate court concluded that the purchasers
waived any complaint about the Rule 3.08 violation, granted mandamus
relief, and ordered the trial court to vacate the new trial order and render
judgment in favor of VSDH on the jury’s verdict.264
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS
There were a number of cases in the Survey period addressing impor-
tant, previously unanswered questions under the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, including two by the Texas Supreme Court. In Hoskins
v. Hoskins,265 the Texas Supreme Court held that statutory grounds for
vacating an arbitration award enumerated in the Texas General Arbitra-
tion Act (TAA) are exclusive,266 and distinguished the TAA from the
Federal Arbitration Act267 in holding that common law doctrines such as
“manifest disregard for the law” or “gross mistake” are unavailable to
vacate an award unless the parties’ arbitration agreement otherwise
brings those doctrines within the purview of the TAA’s enumerated
grounds.268 In Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte, the Texas Supreme Court
263. Id. at *8 n.6.
264. Id. at *9.
265. 497 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. 2016).
266. Id. at 497. The supreme court noted that the TAA states that an award shall be
confirmed unless grounds are offered for vacating it under Section 171.088 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Id. at 494 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 171.087 (West 2011)). In turn, Section 171.088 states the award shall be vacated if:
(1) it was “obtained by corruption, fraud, or other undue means”;
(2) “the rights of a party were prejudiced by”
(i) “evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator”;
(ii) “corruption in an arbitrator”; or
(iii) “misconduct or willful misbehavior of an arbitrator”
(3) the arbitrators
(i) “exceeded their powers”;
(ii) “refused to postpone the hearing after a showing of sufficient cause”;
(iii) “refused to hear evidence material to the controversy”; or
(iv) “conducted the hearing, contrary to [various statutory provisions], in a man-
ner that substantially prejudiced the rights of a party”; or
(4) “there was no agreement to arbitrate, the issue was not adversely determined in a
proceeding under Subchapter B, and the party did not participate . . . without
raising the objection.”
Id. (noting that the “text could not be plainer: the trial court ‘shall confirm’ an award
unless vacatur is required under one of the enumerated grounds in section 171.088”).
267. Id. at 498 (Willett, J., concurring) (noting that the supreme court’s decision that
the enumerated TAA grounds are exclusive “avoid[s] the sort of quagmire that surrounds
the TAA’s federal counterpart,” the Federal Arbitration Act, with regard to the availabil-
ity and applicability of common law vacatur doctrines like manifest disregard).
268. Id. at 494. For example, the supreme court distinguished its decision in Nafta Trad-
ers, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Tex. 2011), explaining that the complaint there, that
an arbitrator committed reversible error, fell within the “exceeded their powers” vacatur
ground of the TAA since the parties had agreed to limit the arbitrator’s power “to that of a
judge, whose decisions are reviewable on appeal.” Hoskins,497 S.W.3d at 494–95. The su-
preme court noted that there was no limitation “on the arbitrator’s authority to issue a
decision unsupported by the law” in the Hoskins arbitration agreement, and thus no basis
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answered certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in the affirmative about whether “civil penalties” under
the Texas Ophthalmology Act (Ophthalmology Act)269 constituted “ex-
emplary damages” limited by Chapter 41 of the Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code.270 The Fifth Circuit certified the questions271 after a jury
awarded four individual optometrists $3.953 million in civil penalties
against Wal–Mart, representing the maximum $1,000 daily penalty under
the Ophthalmology Act for the period the optometrists operated under
violating leases.272 While expressing concern that its answers may be hy-
pothetical,273 the supreme court concluded that Chapter 41 applied to
private recovery of “civil penalties” under the Ophthalmology Act, and
the civil penalties awarded to the optometrists constituted “exemplary
damages” under Chapter 41 such that they were not recoverable in the
absence of the optometrists’ recovery of other damages.274
Lower appellate courts grappled with the meaning of the terms
“award” and “judgment” when used in the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in two cases with arguably conflicting results. The meaning of Rule
169’s limitation on a plaintiff’s recovery in fast-track cases to a judgment
not exceeding $100,000 was at issue in Cross v. Wagner.275 Following a car
accident, the plaintiff filed suit and invoked Rule 169’s “expedited actions
process.”276 After trial, the jury found both the plaintiff and the defen-
for the complaining party to argue “manifest disregard of the law” fell within the “ex-
ceeded [their] powers” or any other enumerated ground of the TAA. Id. at 495.
269. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 351.001–.068 (West 2012 & Supp. 2016). In general, the
Ophthalmology Act prohibits commercial retailers of ophthalmic goods from attempting to
control the practice of optometry.
270. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte, 497 S.W.3d 460, 461 (Tex. 2016). In the underlying
suit, four optometrists brought suit against Wal–Mart claiming its leases for in-house Vi-
sion Centers violated the Ophthalmology Act by attempting to dictate the number of hours
worked by the lessee optometrists. Id. at 462–63.
271. The certified questions, verbatim, were:
1. Whether an action for a “civil penalty” under the [Ophthalmology Act] is
an “action in which a claimant seeks damages relating to a cause of ac-
tion” within the meaning of Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. In other words, are civil penalties awarded under Tex.
Occ. Code § 351.605 “damages” as that term is used in Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 41.002(a).
2. If civil penalties awarded under the [Ophthalmology Act] are “damages”
as that term is used in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.002(a), whether
they are “exemplary damages” such that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 41.004(a) precludes their recovery in any case where a plaintiff does not
receive damages other than nominal damages.
Id. at 463–64. The supreme court answered “yes” to both. Id. at 467.
272. Id. at 462–63. The district court had “instructed the jury that the [o]ptometrists ‘do
not claim that they have suffered any physical or economic damages [and] only seek to
recover civil penalties.’” Id. at 463.
273. Id. at 461. The State argued that the supreme court should decline to answer the
certified questions since they were based on an incorrect statement of Texas law—namely,
that the Ophthalmology Act allowed a private right of action for civil penalties in the first
place. Id. at 464. Three dissenting judges would have declined to answer the certified ques-
tions for this reason. Id. at 467–68 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 467.
275. 497 S.W.3d 611, 612 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).
276. Id. at 613.
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dant negligent, assigning fault to the plaintiff at 49% and the defendant at
51%, and found plaintiff suffered $170,225.22 in damages.277 At the plain-
tiff’s request and over the defendant’s objection, the trial court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $92,718.19, representing the dam-
ages found by the jury reduced by the plaintiff’s percentage of fault, plus
pre-judgment interest and court costs. The defendant appealed, arguing
that the judgment should have been limited to $51,000, representing her
51% responsibility for the maximum $100,000 jury award, since the case
was tried as a Rule 169 expedited action.278 The El Paso Court of Ap-
peals rejected the argument that Rule 169 operated as a cap of $100,000
on the jury’s damages award, reasoning that the Rule’s plain language
made it clear that the limitation applied to a plaintiff’s recovery of a judg-
ment over $100,000 but did not affect the amount of damages a plaintiff
could ask the fact-finder to award or the amount a fact-finder could
award.279
In Bobo v. Varughese,280 the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed
for the first time whether pre-judgment interest is considered in making
the comparison between a Rule 167 settlement offer and judgment for
purposes of shifting litigation costs.281 After a trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff passenger in a vehicle that collided with
the defendant’s vehicle in the amount of $40,358.21. On the plaintiff’s
motion, the trial court entered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for
$49,072.28, which included the award, pre-judgment interest, and court
costs. The defendant moved to modify the judgment, arguing that the
judgment, if pre-judgment interest was properly calculated, was less
favorable than the defendant’s rejected Rule 167 settlement offer of
$55,000.282 After re-calculating the pre-judgment interest, the trial court
entered an amended final judgment of $43,823.13 for the plaintiff, deter-
mined that the defendant was entitled to recover $44,857.27 in litigation
costs incurred after rejection of the Rule 167 offer, and entered a take-
nothing judgment in favor of the defendant after offsetting the defen-
dant’s litigation costs against the plaintiff’s judgment.283
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that Rule 167 and Chapter 42 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code284 both refer to “the judgment
to be awarded” and “the judgment to be rendered” respectively rather
277. Id. at 612.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 614–15 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 169(b), cmt. 4).
280. 507 S.W.3d 817 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (noting that the issue “ap-
pears to be a case of first impression”).
281. See id. at 823; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.4(a), (b)(1) (providing that when a
judgment is less than 80% of a rejected settlement offer made under the Rule, the court
“must award the offeror litigation costs against the offeree from the time the offer was
rejected to the time of judgment”). Litigation costs under the Rule include “reasonable
attorney fees.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.4(c)(4).
282. Bobo, 507 S.W.3d at 819–20.
283. Id. at 819.
284. Id. at 821 n.8 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001–.005 (West
2015), the enabling statute allowing the promulgation of Rule 167).
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than a jury “verdict” or “award,” thus showing that pre-judgment interest
should be included in the calculation for comparison purposes.285 The
court of appeals reviewed the legislative history of Chapter 42 and the
promulgation and text of Rule 167, noting that neither defines the terms
“award,” “judgment,” “judgment award,” or “monetary claims.”286 The
court analyzed the legislature’s use of the term “award” throughout the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code to mean certain types of damages
awarded by the fact-finder and concluded that the term “award” in Sec-
tion 42.004 referred to “the damages awarded by the fact-finder, rather
than the final judgment rendered by the trial court.”287 Since Rule 167.4
was intended to implement Section 42.004, the court held that the term
“judgment” as used in Rule 167.4(b)(1) and (2) had to mean “the dam-
ages awarded by the fact-finder” and not the “judgment rendered by the
trial court.”288 The court of appeals thus held that “prejudgment interest
is not considered when comparing ‘the judgment award on monetary
claims’ to ‘an offer to settle those claims’ under Rule 167.4(b).”289 The
appellate court found that the trial court therefore properly offset the
defendant’s litigation costs from the plaintiff’s award and affirmed the
take-nothing judgment in favor of the defendant.290
Whether a named defendant could designate a former co-defendant as
a responsible third party under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code was at issue in In re CVR Energy, Inc.291 In this case, two
plaintiffs’ husbands had been killed in an explosion at a named defen-
dant’s refinery. They sued, alleging that the refinery operator defendant’s
negligence and gross negligence caused the deaths. The refinery operator
defendant was wholly owned by CVR, which was also named as a defen-
dant to the suit. Over the next twenty months, CVR did not name the
refinery operator co-defendant as a potential responsible third party in
response to the plaintiffs’ disclosure requests. Fifty-five days before trial,
however, the plaintiffs non-suited the refinery operator defendant, and
twenty-six days later, CVR disclosed the former refinery operator defen-
dant as a potential responsible third party and moved to designate it
under Chapter 33.292 Plaintiffs objected, the trial court denied CVR’s mo-
285. Id. at 821. The plaintiff also argued that if pre-judgment interest had been properly
calculated by the trial court, the total amount of her judgment, including pre-judgment
interest, was 81.09% of the Rule 167 settlement offer. Id. Although the court of appeals
determined that the trial court had improperly calculated the pre-judgment interest, it
found the error harmless given its holding that pre-judgment interest was not considered
for Rule 167 comparison purposes discussed above. Id. at 829.
286. Id. at 827–28. The court also noted that Rule 167.2 does not define the term “inter-
est” either.
287. Id. at 828.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 829 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.4).
290. Id.
291. 500 S.W.3d 67, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding).
292. Id. at 72–73 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001–.017 (West
2015) (setting out Texas’s proportionate responsibility scheme)).
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tion to designate, and CVR sought mandamus relief.293
On mandamus, the First Houston Court of Appeals noted the two limi-
tations on a defendant’s ability to designate a responsible third party
under Section 33.004. First, a defendant could not designate within sixty
days of trial absent a finding of good cause.294 Second, a defendant could
not designate if it was obligated to disclose the potential responsible third
party earlier, failed to do so, and limitations on a plaintiff’s claim against
the untimely disclosed party had run in the interim.295 The court of ap-
peals held, however, that neither limitation precluded CVR’s designation
of the former refinery operator defendant as a responsible third party
under the circumstances.296 With respect to the first limitation, the court
found that CVR had no obligation to disclose the refinery operator as a
potential responsible third party while it was named as a co-defendant in
the suit, reasoning that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “third party”
is “a party that is not otherwise a party to the litigation.”297 With regard
to the time limitation, the court of appeals found that there was good
cause for CVR’s designation of the refinery operator within the sixty-day
period before trial because plaintiffs non-suited the co-defendant within
that period.298 The court of appeals further held that CVR’s amendment
of its disclosures and motion to designate the refinery operator within
thirty days of the non-suit was “reasonably prompt” under Rule 193.5(b)
and demonstrated “good cause” under Section 33.004(a).299 The court of
appeals granted CVR mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to grant
CVR’s motion to designate the former co-defendant as a responsible
third party.300
XV. CONCLUSION
The Texas Supreme Court and intermediate courts of appeals have
continued in this Survey period to expand precedent on existing procedu-
ral rules to guide the trial courts in properly managing their dockets.
293. Id. at 72.
294. Id. at 73 (citing CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 33.004(a)).
295. Id. (citing and quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 33.004(d)).
296. Id. at 79.
297. Id. at 78. The court relied on the common meaning of the terms used because the
“current version of the responsible-third-party statute does not address whether a person
may simultaneously be a defendant and a responsible third party.” Id. at 75.
298. Id. at 79.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 84.
